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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
GENTRY GAMBLE 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. LARSEN and CATHERINE 
J. WHEELER, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal No. 970454-CA 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant Gentry Gamble ("plaintiff") appeals the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Pat B. Brian 
entered on June 27, 1997, dismissing plaintiff's Complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
(R. 182-87; see addendum A attached) -1 This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2 (a)-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 
1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the lower court properly concluded 
that the clear and unequivocal language of the consent to 
adoption and the adoption decree itself relinquished and 
1
 The relevant portions of the lower court record are cited 
as (R. ). The relevant documents from the lower court record 
have been included in the attached addenda. 
1 
terminated all of plaintiff's rights and interests in the adopted 
children? 
Standard of Review: Because the lower court's finding was 
based solely upon written documents, this Court may examine the 
documents de novo and determine the facts. In Re Adoption of 
Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the lower court properly concluded 
that plaintiff's Complaint fails to state an independent cause of 
action under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set 
aside the Decree of Adoption on the basis of fraud on the court? 
Standard of Review: Because the lower court's finding was 
based solely on written documents, this Court may examine the 
documents de novo and determine the facts. In Re Adoption of 
Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988) . 
Issue No. 3: Whether the lower court properly dismissed the 
case without ruling on whether the matter should be certified to 
juvenile court? 
Standard of Review: A correction of error applies to 
appellate review of an issue of law. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 
P.2d 987 (Utah 1997) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(2) (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict 
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is not 
a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation 
of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to 
the offended party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(3) (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
2 
The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk of 
fraud or misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, ... the 
unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility 
to protect his own rights in adoptive proceedings and that 
the burden of fraud must be borne by him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20 (1995) provides: 
A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed 
and may not be revoked. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990) provides in pertinent part: 
The court shall examine each person appearing before it in 
accordance with this chapter, separately, and, if satisfied 
that the interests of the child will be promoted by the 
adoption, it shall enter a final decree of adoption that the 
child is adopted by the adoptive parent or parents and shall 
be regarded and treated in all respects as the children of 
the adoptive parent or parents. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990) provides: 
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time the 
final decree of adoption is entered, released from all 
parental duties toward and all responsibilities for the 
adopted child, and have no further rights with regard to 
that child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 (1996) (Appellant's Brief Addendum G) 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party of his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to more for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it 
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
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the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),(2),(3), or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgement, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment 
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
Rule 4-902 (1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides: 
(1) In district court cases where there is a question 
concerning the support, custody or visitation of a child and 
a petition concerning abuse, dependency, or neglect of the 
same child has been filed in juvenile court, the district 
court shall certify the question of support, custody or 
visitation to the juvenile court for determination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff appeals from the lower court's final appealable 
order granting defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted (R. 182-87). 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed a civil Complaint against defendants 
Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen on March 14, 1997, claiming 
three causes of action: (1) an independent action for fraud on 
the court pursuant to Rule 60(b) seeking to set aside a Decree of 
Adoption entered on April 27, 1995; (2) an action seeking to 
enforce or establish visitation rights with defendants' two 
children; and (3), an action seeking to terminate defendants' 
parental rights (R. 1-10). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
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for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 28-39) . Plaintiff responded by 
filing a motion for an order certifying the matter to juvenile 
court and for leave of court to amend the Complaint (R. 46-48) . 
The proposed Amended Complaint deleted the cause of action 
seeking to terminate parental rights and added a cause of action 
for specific performance and breach of contract seeking ongoing 
visitation rights (R. 70-80). Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a 
separate action in Third District Juvenile Court again seeking to 
terminate defendants' parental rights (R. 172-74). After 
reviewing the relevant documents and conducting a hearing on the 
matter, the lower court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 175-
76, see Minute Entry attached as Addendum B; 182-87). In sum, 
the lower court ruled that plaintiff consented to the adoption, 
that the Decree of Adoption terminated plaintiff's parental 
rights and that plaintiff has no standing to seek visitation 
rights (Id.). The lower court further denied plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend the Complaint on the basis that it does not allege any 
legally enforceable contract right to visitation (Id.). Because 
the matter was dismissed, the lower court did not address 
plaintiff's Motion to Certify the Case to Juvenile Court (Id.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant Catherine Wheeler were divorced on 
April 14, 1989 (R. 11-16). Two children were born during the 
marriage, Baron and Trevor Wheeler Gamble, ages 3 and 2 
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respectively at the time (R. 12, 30). Defendant Wheeler was 
awarded permanent care, custody and control of the children 
subject to plaintiff's reasonable rights of visitation (R. 12 at 
H 2). Plaintiff was further ordered to pay $200.00 per month per 
child, for a total support obligation of $400.00 per month (R. 13 
at H 3). Plaintiff failed to maintain his court ordered child 
support obligation and became seriously delinquent in his child 
support payments (R. 2 at 11's 8-9). 
Defendants Catherine Wheeler and Daniel Larsen were married 
on March 1, 1991 (R. 71 at 1 7). On February 24, 1995, defendant 
Larsen filed a petition in the Third Judicial District Court 
seeking to adopt the children (R. 2 at 1l0). Plaintiff agreed to 
the adoption and signed a document on March 20, 1995 entitled 
"Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to Children 
Conceived or Born Within Marriage and Waiver of Notice" (R. 40-
43; attached as Addendum C). Thereafter, Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick entered a Decree of Adoption on April 27, 1995, forever 
terminating plaintiff's parental rights and duties (R. 17-18; 
attached as addendum D). 
Approximately two years later, on March 14, 1997, plaintiff 
instituted the present action seeking to set aside the adoption, 
or in the alternative, to establish or enforce visitation rights 
(R. 1-10) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Two years after the adoption, plaintiff seeks to revoke his 
consent and set aside the adoption decree. He argues that the 
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concept of an open adoption should be applied retroactively in 
this case, thus allowing him to retain visitation rights with the 
adopted children without any related duty of support. The lower 
court correctly rejected plaintiff's attempt to rescind his 
unequivocal consent to the adoption and further ruled that 
adoption decree forever terminated all rights and duties of 
plaintiff with regard to the adopted children. 
Plaintiff further seeks to set aside the adoption decree on 
the basis of fraud on the court under Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
He claims that a letter accompanying the adoption papers 
constitutes an agreement for ongoing visitation rights. He 
argues that the consent and adoption decree were fraudulent 
because defendants did not submit the letter to the adoption 
court. After carefully reviewing the language of the consent and 
adoption decree, the lower court accurately concluded that the 
plain contract language of the adoption papers clearly and 
unequivocally terminated all of plaintiff's rights and duties. 
The ambiguous reference to visitation in the letter does not 
create any legally enforceable right when read in conjunction 
with the plain and obvious language of the accompanying adoption 
papers which were acknowledged and signed by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had the responsibility to protect his own rights and 
had an equal opportunity to present information to the adoption 
court. Most importantly, defendants did not prevent plaintiff 
from presenting information to the adoption court and no false 
representations were made by defendants to the adoption court. 
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Thus, the finality of the adoption decree must be preserved and 
not set aside simply because plaintiff wants visitation rights 
with the adopted children. 
Finally, plaintiff seeks to undo the lower court's ruling 
and to certify the matter to juvenile court. After filing this 
matter in district court, he later filed a petition in juvenile 
court which he now claims has exclusive original jurisdiction. 
Although the lower court did not rule on this issue below, 
plaintiff's argument should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, plaintiff continued to pursue this matter in the lower 
court and did not voluntarily dismiss his Complaint. Second, the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's 
independent action under Rule 60(b) seeking to set aside the 
adoption decree. The only issue before the lower court was 
whether the adoption decree should be set aside, not whether 
plaintiff should be awarded custody or visitation rights. 
Lastly, the Utah Supreme court has recognized that a mere 
allegation in a petition filed in juvenile court does not divest 
the district court of jurisdiction or prove that the juvenile 
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of custody 
or visitation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF CONSENTED TO THE DECREE OF ADOPTION AND THE 
TERMINATION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Two years after the adoption, plaintiff sought to undo the 
Decree of Adoption and to reestablish ongoing visitation rights 
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(R. 1-10). The lower court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss for the reason that both plaintiff's consent 
and the court's Decree of Adoption clearly and unequivocally 
terminated plaintiff's parental rights (R. 175-76, 182-87). No 
provision for continued visitation was made in either the consent 
or the decree (Id.). 
On appeal, plaintiff now suggests this Court should embrace 
the concept of "open adoption" and grant him post-adoption 
visitation rights. While the concept of "open adoption" may have 
some merit in evaluating the best interests of a child in the 
context of an ongoing adoption proceeding, the concept has no 
application in this case. 
A. THE CONSENT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR POST-ADOPTION VISITATION 
RIGHTS 
First, plaintiff's consent to the adoption relinquishes all 
of his parental rights and duties, without reservation (R. 40-
42). Plaintiff signed the document on March 20, 1995, plainly 
entitled ''Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to 
Children Conceived or Born Within Marriage and Waiver of Notice" 
(emphasis added) (Id., attached as Addendum C). The language of 
the consent is clear and absolute. An obvious warning appears in 
bold capital letters at the top of the consent document as 
follows: 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU HAVE 
ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT WITH AN 
ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY SIGNING THIS 
DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS AS A PARENT. YOU 
CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE 
YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
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(R. 4 0-42)(emphasis in original). The document further provides 
at paragraph 7 as follows: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final decree 
of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 0-
11 (1990, as amended), he will be released from all future 
parental duties toward and all future responsibilities for 
the adopted children, and have no further rights with regard 
to the children. 
(R. 41 at H 7)(emphasis added). The finality of the consent was 
further explained in paragraph 8 as follows: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final decree 
of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 
(1990, as amended), that the children will be adopted by the 
petitioner and the children shall be regarded and treated in 
all respects as the children of the petitioner and Catherine 
Wheeler. 
(Id. at H 8)(emphasis added). The legal significance of the 
consent was noted in paragraph 10 as follows: "[Plaintiff] has 
had the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice of an 
attorney of his choice." (R. 42 at H 10)(emphasis added). 
Paragraph 12 provides that plaintiff "consents to the granting of 
a petition for adoption and consents to the adoption by 
petitioner of the children." (Id. at H 12). Finally, the consent 
certifies that plaintiff "has read and understands the foregoing 
consent to adoption, and signs it freely and voluntarily." (Id. 
at 14). Plaintiff's claim for post-adoption visitation rights is 
repudiated by his unequivocal consent to terminate his parental 
rights thus allowing the adoption decree to be granted without 
reservation. 
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B. THE ADOPTION DECREE DID NOT PROVIDE FOR POST-ADOPTION 
VISITATION RIGHTS 
Secondly, the Decree of Adoption entered by Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick on April 27, 1995, is likewise clear and unequivocal 
that "all rights and interests of [plaintiff] with regard to [the 
children] are hereby and forever terminated" (R. 18 at f 4) 
(emphasis added). Again, no reservation or provision is made for 
a so-called "open adoption" which would allow future contact or 
visitation. The concept of an "open adoption" was never 
considered by the parties, never agreed to between the parties, 
never presented to Judge Frederick and not included in the 
adoption decree (Id.). 
C. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE CONCEPT OF "OPEN 
ADOPTION" 
Third, plaintiff's Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint 
in the lower court do not mention the concept of an "open 
adoption", much less allege a cause of action to enforce any 
agreement between the parties for an "open adoption" (R. 1-10, 
70-80) . Accordingly, the lower court did not rule on the 
advisability of this new legal concept of open adoption in Utah 
(R. 182-87). 
Plaintiff raises the issue of open adoption on appeal in a 
belated attempt to persuade this Court to grant post-adoption 
visitation rights. In essence, plaintiff requests this Court to 
amend the Decree of Adoption more than two and one-half years 
later. This Court should reject plaintiff's invitation to adopt 
such a new legal concept which was not agreed to between the 
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parties, included in the adoption decree or pled in the Complaint 
reviewed by the lower court. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
359 (Utah App. 1993) (As a general rule, appellate courts will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). 
D. AN OPEN ADOPTION IS INAPPROPRIATE ABSENT THE PARTIES 
AGREEMENT AND THE ADOPTION COURT'S APPROVAL 
Finally, the cases and authorities referenced by plaintiff 
do not support his claim that "open adoption" or "post adoption 
visitation77 is appropriate in the present case.2 Plaintiff cites 
2
 Plaintiff cites several cases from other jurisdictions to 
support his proposition that "open adoption77 should be approved 
by this court and imposed in this case. A brief review of these 
cases reveals that an open adoption is not a viable option in 
this case. 
Plaintiff's relies on Morse v. Daly, 704 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 
1985), in which the Nevada Supreme Court held it was within 
proper exercise of lower court's equitable powers to condition an 
adoption decree upon the continued jurisdiction of the court to 
consider future requests for visitation privileges by a child's 
stepgrandmother. Id. at 1089. The court reasoned that such a 
condition was not precluded by statute or case authority. Id. 
Contrary to plaintiff's representation, the Morse court did not 
affirm an open adoption decree or grant post-adoption visitation 
for a natural parent. The Morse court expressly rejected an 
"open adoption7' claim "because the parties have not agreed to 
continuing visitation." Id. at n. 2 (emphasis added). The court 
further explained that an "open adoption" 
'occurs when, prior to the adoption, it is agreed in writing 
that the child will have continuing contact with one or more 
members of his or her biological family after the adoption 
is completed... The court would approve the agreement if it 
could be shown that this was in the child's best interest. 
The agreement would then be incorporated into the final 
order of adoption. The court would maintain jurisdiction as 
in a divorce proceeding and could modify the agreement if 
necessary for the child's welfare.' 
Id. (quoting Amadio & Deutsch, Open Adoption; Allowing Adopted 
Children to "Stay in Touch" With Blood Relatives, 22 J.Fam.L. 59, 
60061 (1983) (footnote omitted in original, emphasis added)). 
In the present case, the parties did not enter into a 
written agreement for an open adoption, the court did not approve 
or incorporate such an agreement into the Decree of Adoption, and 
the court did not maintain jurisdiction to modify the Decree of 
12 
a Utah case where the foster parents sought to adopt an Indian 
child who had been living with them outside the reservation. In 
the Matter of Adoption of Holloway, 732 P.2d 962 n. 11 (Utah 
1986). Having found that the Indian courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter, Justice Zimmerman dropped a 
footnote suggesting that an innovative approach to adoption, 
called an "open adoption", may be suited to the facts of the 
case. Id. Justice Zimmerman did not mention post-adoption 
visitation, but merely explained that the fundamental concept of 
an open adoption is to allow some communication between the 
adoptive and natural parents and, when appropriate, to permit 
communication between the natural parent and the child as the 
child grows up. Id. He suggested that the child could remain 
with his adoptive parents, but also allow the tribe to teach the 
child about his Indian heritage. Id. Justice Zimmerman 
Adoption. Because an open adoption did not occur, this Court 
should reject plaintiff's attempt to modify the Decree of 
Adoption by creating new law in Utah. 
The Utah cases cited by plaintiff are also inapplicable. See 
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978)(Remanding divorce 
action to trial court to determine whether the stepparent stands 
in loco parentis to his stepchild, whether it is in child's best 
interest to allow stepparent a right of visitation, and whether 
visitation rights should be conditioned upon stepparents 
agreement to pay a proper share of child support); Workman v. 
Workman, 498 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Okla. 1972)(Because stepfather 
assumed status and obligation in loco parentis, two deceased 
children could not maintain wrongful death action against 
stepfather for negligent operation of a vehicle); State of Utah 
In Re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) (In a case where the 
natural mother's parental rights had been terminated, her husband 
had standing to seek custody of a child born into his marriage, 
although the child was not his biological offspring, since 
husband was child's stepparent and husband had legal obligation 
of support prior to dissolution of marriage). 
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cautioned that his comment was merely an observation and 
recognized that it was not the court's matter to decide on 
appeal. Id. 
Unlike the circumstances in Holloway, the adoption in the 
present case was finalized more than two and a half years ago. 
Judge Frederick was required by statute to determine whether the 
adoption was in "the best interest [s] of the [children]." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-1.5 (1990). Plaintiff's unequivocal consent to 
the adoption represents his agreement with Judge Frederick that 
it was in the best interests of the children that his parental 
rights be terminated and that he be released from "all future 
parental duties toward and all future responsibilities for the 
adopted children, and have no further rights with regard to the 
children." (R. 40 at 1 7). Plaintiff further represented and 
agreed that it was in the best interests of the children to be 
adopted by defendant Larsen and that "the children shall be 
regarded and treated in all respects as the children of [Mr. 
Larsen] and Catherine Wheeler." (R. 40 at 1 8). 
Nowhere in the adoption proceedings before Judge Frederick 
did plaintiff seek to preserve any parental rights or visitation 
privileges. The final entry of the Decree of Adoption on April 
27, 1995, precludes plaintiff's attempt to obtain an "open 
adoption" or to establish post-adoption visitation. Because the 
concept of open adoption was never agreed to between the parties, 
much less considered or ruled upon by the lower court, this court 
need not consider the applicability of open adoption in this 
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appeal.3 To rule otherwise would disrupt the finality of any 
adoption decree in Utah and subject adoptive parents to the 
unwanted risk of having their adoption set aside or reviewed for 
application of the open adoption concept. 
POINT II 
THE ADOPTION DOCUMENTS ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE FOREVER TERMINATED 
A. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE A FRAUD UPON THE COURT 
Plaintiff's attempt to set aside the adoption decree is 
premised upon the language in Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides as follows: "This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." The Utah Supreme 
3
 Notably, plaintiff did not timely file a motion before 
Judge Frederick seeking to challenge or set aside the adoption 
decree under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion 
under Rule 60(b) "shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1),(2),(3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgement, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id. In 
Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah App. 1992), this Court 
held that a plaintiff's action to set aside an adoption decree, 
brought three and one-half years after the adoption order was 
granted, was not brought with a "reasonable time" under Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court explained 
that what constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the fact of 
each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, 
the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to 
learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the 
other parties, Id. at 261, (citing, Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 
1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Instead, this case arises out of an independent action under 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in which plaintiff 
seeks relief from Judge Frederick's adoption decree. Therefore, 
the only issue on appeal is whether the lower court properly 
denied plaintiff's attempt to set aside the adoption decree, not 
whether an open adoption should be granted in the adoption case. 
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Court recognized such independent actions in St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). In St. Pierre, an ex-wife 
sought to set aside the property distribution in a divorce decree 
on the basis of duress. The court held that Rule 60(b) expressly 
preserves a court's power to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment or decree on the ground it was 
obtained by fraud. To justify setting aside a divorce decree, 
the court defined fraud as u [a]n intentional act by a party in a 
divorce action which prevents the opposing party from making a 
full defense....'' Id. at 619.4 The court ruled that the alleged 
use of harassment, threats of bodily harm, physical abuse and 
intimidation forcing plaintiff to sign the divorce settlement 
documents was sufficient to state a claim for duress. 
In the present case, plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the 
adoption decree was based upon fraud and should therefore be set 
aside. Unlike the plaintiff in St. Pierre, he does not allege 
4
 "Fraud upon the court" has been further defined by the 
United States Supreme Court as "a wrong against the institutions 
set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which 
fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good 
order of society." Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford Empire 
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). Such fraud has also been 
described as fraud that "does or attempts to subvert the 
integrity of the court itself or that is perpetrated by officers 
of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the 
usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are 
presented for adjudication." Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure, Civ.2d § 2870. Examples of fraud upon the 
court include bribery of a judge, or counsel engaging in a 
conspiracy to produce fabricated evidence. No such fraud is 
alleged in plaintiff's Complaint. 
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fraud by duress.5 Instead, he claims that the consent for 
adoption was based upon the condition that he could continue 
visitation with the adopted children. In other words, he 
maintains that the consent and adoption decree do not accurately 
reflect his agreement and understanding. Thus, this case hinges 
upon the question of whether plaintiff is bound by the explicit 
terms of the consent and the adoption decree. 
B. AN ADOPTION AGREEMENT IS INTERPRETED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that an agreement to 
adopt is considered a contract. In Re Adoption of D, 252 P.2d 
223, 228 (Utah 1953). A parent's consent to adoption, once 
voluntarily given, and acted upon by the adopting parents, cannot 
be withdrawn without good cause. Id. After acceptance, such "a 
contract is enforceable against the adopting parents and ought to 
be enforceable by them." Id. at 22 9; see also In Re Adoption of 
K, 465 P.2d 541, 543 (Utah 1970)("Agreements of adoption are 
merely contractual arrangements and are entitled to be enforced 
the same as are all other types of contract except as the welfare 
of the child might otherwise require.). In addition, the 
doctrine of estoppel,6 and other principles of equity, "would 
5
 While plaintiff asserts that threats of civil and 
criminal penalties for child non-support was a factor, he does 
not assert that his consent was involuntary. Nor does he claim 
that he was induced to sign the consent by use of harassment, 
threats of bodily harm, physical abuse or intimidation as was the 
case in St. Pierre. 
6
 Although not presented to the lower court, this Court 
should find that plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel from disputing the clear language in his Certified 
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preclude a court from assisting appellant to regain the custody 
of the child.7' Id. 
The Utah legislature has likewise determined that a consent 
to adoption becomes an irrevocable contract at the moment it is 
signed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20 (1995), provides that an 
adoption "consent or relinquishment is effective when it is 
signed and may not be revoked."7 Utah law further provides that 
Consent to the effect that he understood and voluntarily 
relinquished all rights and duties regarding the adopted 
children. Weber v. Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)(Appellate 
court may affirm the lower court on any proper ground). The 
principle of judicial estoppel prevents a party from seeking 
relief by contradicting his own sworn statements in a judicial 
proceeding. See Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 704 (Utah 1985) (Durham, 
J. dissenting). Judicial estoppel is based upon a strong and 
independent public policy, namely, the need to uphold the 
sanctity of oaths and the integrity of the judicial process. See 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 p.2d 731, 734 (Utah 
1995), (citing Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d at 704-05 (Durham, 
J.,dissenting)). Unlike equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel 
does not require prejudice to the adverse party. Weise, 699 P.2d 
at 705. This principle was discussed in an analogous case where 
Justice Durham wrote that a party should be judicially estopped 
from contesting paternity after the party signed a divorce 
stipulation and agreement representing that he was the father of 
the child. Id. at 706. Likewise, plaintiff should be judicially 
estopped from contesting the adoption decree after he signed the 
Certified Consent representing that he relinquished all parental 
rights. 
7
 This Court has previously noted that the Utah Legislature 
enacted a new adoption act in 1995 recognizing that there is VMno 
practical way to remove all risk of fraud or misrepresentation in 
adoption proceedings.'" Matter of Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113 
n. 9 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(3) 
(1995). As a matter of public policy, the legislature determined 
that an unmarried biological father has the primary 
responsibility to protect his own rights in adoptive proceedings 
and that the burden of fraud must be borne by him. Id. Under 
the new adoption statute, a fraudulent representation is not a 
basis to set aside an adoption decree. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 0-
4.15 (2) (1995) 
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after an adoption decree is entered by a court, the birth 
parent's rights are completely terminated. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-30-11 ("The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the 
time the final decree of adoption is entered, released from all 
parental duties toward and all responsibilities for the adopted 
child, and have no further rights with regard to that child."). 
These statutory provisions are consistent with Utah case law 
recognizing a strong need for finality regarding the adoption of 
children establishing new family relationships.8 
Recognizing that plaintiff's consent to the adoption was a 
contract, the lower court analyzed the Certified Consent and 
Decree of Adoption under principles of contract law (R 185). When 
a court is asked to interpret a contract, it must first look to 
the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of 
the parties. Ron Case Roofing v. Bloomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989). It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that 
the intent of the parties is to be determined from the writing 
itself, with each provision being considered in relation to all 
others. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) . The plain meaning rule 
applies to preserve the intent of the parties and to protect the 
8See Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah App. 1992) ("[F]rom 
strictly a humanitarian standpoint, there must be an end to the 
emotional stress and strain that is involved in the natural 
parents' attempt to regain custody of a child. The strain is 
particularly acute to the adoptive child itself, who may have 
established strong bonds of affection and love for the adoptive 
parents, and to the adoptive parents who must suffer the spectre 
of losing their child."); 
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agreement from judicial revision. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). When the 
meaning of a contract is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the 
parties and a court may interpret the contract as a matter of 
law. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 
802 P.2d at 725; Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983). To be ambiguous, both parties' interpretations must 
be contrary and both must be tenable. See, e.g.. Grow v. Marwick 
Dev., Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 1980). 
C. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
THE CONSENT AND ADOPTION DECREE 
In the present case, the lower court carefully reviewed the 
language of the consent and the adoption decree (R. 182). In its 
findings of fact, the court noted the following language: 
3. The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top of 
the document as follows: 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT 
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY 
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS AS 
A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR 
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be released 
from all future parental duties toward and all future 
responsibilities for the adopted children, and have no 
further rights with regard to the children. 
5. Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the children 
will be adopted by the petitioner and the children 
shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the 
children of the petitioner and Catherine Wheeler. 
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6. Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father 
provides: 
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with and 
obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice." 
7. The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4: "All 
rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to Trevor 
and Baron are hereby and forever terminated." 
(R. 183-84). Based upon this language, the lower court concluded 
as a matter of law that "the language of the Certified and Decree 
of Adoption is clear and unequivocal. Plaintiff Gentry Gamble 
understood and agreed to relinquish all rights to the adopted 
children." (R. 185). The court further concluded that after the 
Decree of Adoption was granted on April 27, 1995, "all rights and 
interests of plaintiff with regard to these children were forever 
terminated." (Id.). 
D. THE LETTER DOES NOT CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT TO POST-
ADOPTION VISITATION 
The only evidence offered by plaintiff to refute the clear 
language of the consent was a letter from the law firm of Cohne, 
Rappaport & Segal which says among other things, "You may 
maintain the present visitation schedule with Trevor and Baron." 
The lower court found that when read in conjunction with the 
clear and unequivocal language of the Certified Consent and the 
Decree of Adoption, "the referenced letter does not create in 
plaintiff any legally enforceable right with regard to the 
adopted children." (Id. at % 3). The court further explained 
that in light of the specific language of the accompanying 
adoption papers, the brief and ambiguous reference to visitation 
in the midst of the attorney's cover letter was not a contract 
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between the parties for post-adoption visitation (R. 185 at H 4). 
As a practical matter, the court noted that the letter "does not 
define the visitation schedule, explain how the visitation 
schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement mechanism or 
preclude the defendants from terminating the visitation 
schedule." (R. Id.). Therefore, the court concluded that the 
defendants, as the parents of the children, could "terminate any 
contact between their children and plaintiff." (Id.).9 
While the lower court's findings with regard to the language 
of the consent and the adoption decree may be reviewed by this 
Court de novo, the plain language of these adoption documents is 
not disputed by plaintiff. Nor are these documents subject to 
any other reasonable interpretation. The only reasonable 
9
 After the adoption, defendants did permit their children 
to have contact with plaintiff, although it was not regular 
contact and it was not under the terms of any agreement. They 
reasoned that if the children desired some contact, and such 
contact was not harmful to the children, they would allow 
plaintiff to maintain contact as they deemed fit. Plaintiff 
falsely reported abuse by defendants in an apparent attempt to 
obtain custody or visitation. Plaintiff's report was 
investigated, determined to be unfounded and no juvenile court 
proceeding was instituted. Due to plaintiff's conduct, 
defendants determined that it was harmful to their family 
relationship to allow plaintiff any further contact. The 
children resent plaintiff's attempt to destroy their family 
relationship and no longer desire any further contact with 
plaintiff. As the childrens' sole parents, defendants have the 
right to make decisions regarding their children, including the 
decision whether their children should be permitted to spend 
weekends, holidays and special occasions in another person's 
home. They also have the related duties as parents to provide 
financial support, shelter, food, education, clothing etc. After 
all, that was the primary purpose of the adoption, to establish 
and maintain a single home with two loving parents that had 
already demonstrated their responsibility for properly supporting 
and raising their children. 
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interpretations from these documents are that; (1) plaintiff 
voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, (2) the adoption 
court accepted the consent, (3) the adoption court found that the 
adoption was in the best interest of the children, and (4) 
plaintiff's parental rights were terminated forever. After the 
adoption was final, plaintiff had no further rights to visitation 
pursuant to any statute, court order or contractual agreement. 
Plaintiff now argues that he would not have consented to the 
adoption if he had known that he would no longer enjoy his 
parental rights (see plaintiff's brief at p. 25). Incredibly, he 
claims it was his understanding that his consent to adoption 
provided him the best of both worlds, i.e., he retained his 
parental rights to visitation but was relieved from his parental 
duties of support.10 Despite that fact that plaintiff read, 
understood and signed the consent, he claims that he had no 
control over the information provided to Judge Frederick prior to 
the adoption (Id.). Because defendants did not submit the above 
referenced attorney's letter to the adoption court, he claims 
that a fraud was perpetrated upon the court. Had the letter been 
disclosed to Judge Frederick, he asserts that the adoption would 
not have been granted. 
10
 Defendants would not have petitioned for the adoption if 
plaintiff were allowed to retain his visitation rights, yet 
escape his court ordered child support duty, a duty he had 
already breached. 
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E. NO FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE TO THE ADOPTION 
COURT 
Plaintiff's claims and arguments are disingenuous. He had 
an equal opportunity to offer any information to the adoption 
court. After all, he was a necessary party to the adoption case. 
As a party, the only information he offered to the adoption court 
was his signed consent. After reading the consent, and having 
had an opportunity to seek the advice of counsel, plaintiff could 
have simply refused to sign the consent document. He could also 
have demanded that the consent document be redrafted by 
defendants to clearly preserve his purported understanding that 
he retained post-adoption visitation rights. Instead, he signed 
the document which clearly relinquishes all parental rights, he 
did not offer any other information to the adoption court, he did 
not contest the adoption, and he did not seek to undo the 
adoption until two years later.11 
Under these facts, it would be a stretch of contract 
jurisprudence to infer an entire open adoption agreement into a 
single, gratuitous ambiguous sentence in an attorney's letter 
which was accompanied by the Petition for Adoption and the clear 
and unequivocal Consent for Adoption (R. 19). In sum, no 
contract for visitation was entered into between the parties. 
11
 See In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285 (Utah 
App. 1995)(Where a mother signed a consent to adoption, she could 
not later revoke her consent after that date); In Re Adoption of 
Maestas, 531 P.2d 492 (Utah 1975)(Where the evidence fully 
justified the trial court in concluding that a mother's consent 
had been given willingly, knowingly and voluntarily, the 
appellate court should not reverse the trial court in that 
regard). 
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The only agreement between the parties was the consent for 
adoption which forever terminated plaintiff's visitation rights. 
Most importantly, defendants made no fraudulent 
representations to the adoption court and plaintiff was not 
forced to sign the consent under duress.12 Unlike the divorce 
case in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d at 619, defendants did 
not engage in any intentional conduct which prevented plaintiff 
"from making a full defense" in the adoption matter. To the 
contrary, plaintiff had every opportunity to participate in the 
adoption proceedings, obtain legal advice regarding his parental 
rights and assure that the consent document fully embodied his 
understanding with regard to his future rights. Plaintiff was 
sufficiently warned that if he signed the consent document, he 
was giving up his rights as a parent and he could not revoke his 
consent later (R. 40). Under these circumstances, this Court 
should affirm the lower court's ruling that plaintiff's Complaint 
and proposed Amended Complaint fail to state a claim to support 
an independent action to set aside the adoption decree for fraud 
upon the court. 
12
 The only fraud being perpetrated in this case is 
plaintiff's claim that he somehow retained his parental rights 
after he; (1) failed to support his children for years; (2) 
consented to adoption in order to avoid his child support 
obligation; (3) signed a plainly worded consent document that 
relinquished his parental rights; (4) failed to contest the 
adoption or present any further evidence; (5) and nullified the 
terms of visitation and support in the divorce decree. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO RULE ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CERTIFY THE CASE TO JUVENILE COURT 
Plaintiff argues that the lower court should have certified 
the entire case to the juvenile court after he filed a separate 
petition to terminate defendants' parental rights in juvenile 
court. He relies upon Rule 4-902, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 (a)-17 (1953 as amended) 
which generally require that a district court should certify to 
the juvenile court questions concerning child support, custody or 
visitation where a petition has been filed in the juvenile court 
concerning abuse, dependency or neglect. Plaintiff's argument 
should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, after filing his petition in juvenile court, 
plaintiff could have voluntarily dismissed his Complaint in 
district court under Rule 41(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Instead, plaintiff sought leave to file an Amended 
Complaint and continued to pursue his action in district court. 
In other words, plaintiff chose to seek relief in both courts. 
Second, the district court case before Judge Brian did not 
involve a question concerning the support, custody or visitation 
of a child. As discussed above, plaintiff filed an independent 
action under Rule 60 (b) to set aside the adoption decree. The 
only question before the district court was whether the adoption 
decree should be set aside, not whether plaintiff should be 
awarded custody or visitation. This court has noted that even if 
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a natural parent brings uan independent action against the 
adoptive parents for alleged fraud or misrepresentation, it is 
unclear what remedy [he] could pursue. Even were [he] to prevail 
on such an action, [he] has no clear right to reinstatement of 
[his] parental rights or to otherwise undo the adoption" In the 
Matter of Baby Bov Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 n. 6 (Utah App. 
1995) . 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the 
juvenile court was created by statute and only has jurisdiction 
in those cases specified therein. In Re State in Interest of 
Valdez, 504 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah 1973). In rejecting a similar 
claim, the court explained that a mere allegation in a petition 
that a parent is unfit does not prove that fact, nor does it 
prove that a child is uneglected", nor does it prove that the 
juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction with respect 
to custody. Id. at 1374-75, (citing In Re O'Hare's Guardianship, 
9 Utah 2d 156, 427 (1959). Where the juvenile court's findings 
were insufficient to establish neglect, the matter was determined 
to be a conventional custody dispute between maternal and 
paternal relatives and was within the jurisdiction of the 
district court. 
In the present case, plaintiff elected to file his lawsuit 
in district court. After defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 
plaintiff instituted a second action in juvenile court. Whether 
plaintiff was court shopping, judge shopping or simply trying to 
attack the adoption decree in two courts, the district court had 
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jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's independent action under 
Rule 60(b). Plaintiff should not be permitted to undo Judge 
Brian's ruling simply because he does not like the outcome of his 
lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, defendants respectfully request this 
Court to affirm the lower court's grant of defendants' motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. Defendants further request this 
Court to award costs and attorney fees to defendants on appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Defendants request oral argument. Oral argument will 
materially assist the Court in understanding the procedural 
context, factual background and relevant law for the issues 
presented. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / "T day of December, 1997. 
? 
Attorney for defendants/appellees 
'wiaiAM W. DOr —' K'1-^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served by First Class Mail two copies of 
the BRIEF OF APPELLEES this \f day of December, 1997, to the 
following: 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN Sc BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
29 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
William W. Downes, Jr. (#0907) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants 
* T • " 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENTRY GAMBLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. LARSEN and 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 970901796 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above-captioned matter came before the court on the 
9th day of May, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, plain-
tiff appearing in person and through counsel, Frederick N. 
Green, and defendants appearing in person and through counsel, 
William W. Downes, Jr. The court reviewed plaintiff's Com-
plaint, the Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to 
Children Conceived Within Marriage and the Decree of Adoption. 
Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby 
enters its: 
Ofl'om 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 24, 1995, Daniel R. Larsen filed a 
Petition in the Third Judicial District Court to adopt Trevor 
Wheeler Gamble and Baron Wheeler Gamble, the natural children 
of his spouse, Catherine J. Wheeler. In the Matter of the 
Adoption of Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and Baron 6. Wheeler 
Gamble. Third District Court Case No. 952900102AD (Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick). 
2. On March 20, 1995, Gentry Gamble, the chiidrens* 
natural father, signed the Certified Consent of Father Giving 
up Rights to Children Conceived Within Marriage and Waiver of 
Notice. 
3. The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top 
of the document as follows: 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT 
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY 
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS 
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR 
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be 
released from all future parental duties toward and 
all future responsibilities for the adopted children, 
and have no further rights with regard to the chil-
dren. 
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5. Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father 
provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, Section 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the 
children will be adopted by the petitioner and the 
children shall be regarded and treated in all 
respects as the children of the petitioner and 
Catherine Wheeler. 
6. Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father 
provides: 
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with 
and obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice. 
7. The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4: 
"All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to 
Trevor and Baron are hereby and forever terminated." 
8. Plaintiff's Complaint references a letter from the 
law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal to plaintiff wherein 
plaintiff was advised: "You may maintain the present visita-
tion schedule with Trevor and Baron." 
9. The Complaint does not reference, nor did plaintiff 
present at oral argument, any other documents to further 
establish or define any ongoing visitation agreement between 
the parties. 
10. Plaintiff sought leave of court to file an Amended 
Verified Complaint alleging an additional cause of action 
styled as "Specific Performance and Breach of Contract." 
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Plaintiff alleges the existence of contractual visitation 
rights that have been breached by the defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
hereby makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under principles of contract law, the language of the 
Certified Consent and the Decree of Adoption is clear and 
unequivocal. Plaintiff Gentry Gamble understood and agreed to 
relinquish all rights to the adopted children. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Adoption granted on April 
27, 1995, all rights and interests of plaintiff with regard to 
these children were forever terminated. 
3. When read in conjunction with the clear and unequivo-
cal language of the Certified Consent and Decree of Adoption, 
the referenced letter does not create in plaintiff any legally 
enforceable right with regard to the adopted children. 
4. The visitation language in the attorney's letter is 
insufficient in light of the adoption papers to create a 
contract for post-adoption visitation. The attorneys letter 
does not define the visitation schedule, explain how the 
visitation schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement 
mechanism or preclude the defendants from terminating the 
visitation schedule. 
4 
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5. As the natural parents of these children pursuant to 
the Decree of Adoption, defendants may terminate any contact 
between their children and plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking to set 
aside the Decree of Adoption pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure should be dismissed with prejudice for 
failing to state a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted. 
7. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action seeking to enforce 
or establish visitation with defendants' children should be 
dismissed with prejudice. In light of Judge Frederick's 
termination of plaintiff's parental rights with these children, 
plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights 
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995. 
8. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action seeking to termi-
nate defendants' parental rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-3(a)-401, et. seq.. should be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile courts of this state 
have exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions. 
9. Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint should be 
denied as futile since the Amended Complaint likewise fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the reasons 
stated above. 
5 
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ORDER 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the ComplainJ; is denied. 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this £) ? day of _^\> &s&',J ^» , 1997. 
Y THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
GREEN & BERRY 
^^derick^N. Green 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pat B. Brian, 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAMBLE, GENTRY 
vs 
LARSEN, DANIEL R 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 970901796 CV 
DATE 05/09/97 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER (NOT REPORTED) 
COURT CLERK BHY 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION TO DISMISS 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N 
D. ATTY. DOWNES, WILLIAM W 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. BOTH PARTIES ARE PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, AS 
SHOWN ABOVE. THE COURT HEARS ARGUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE NATURAL FATHER SIGNED A CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION ON 3/20/95. THE CONSENT CLEARLY STATED ON ITS FACE 
THAT ALL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATURAL FATHER WERE 
PERMANANTLY TERMINATED. THE DECREE OF ADOPTION ALSO CLEARLY 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT RE: RELEASE BY 
NATURAL MOTHER OF ALL CLAIMS FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES AND 
ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT, IN EXCHANGE FOR NATURAL FATHER'S SIGNING 
OF THE CONSENT TO ADOPTION. 
THE COURT FINDS THERE IS ONE LETTER IN EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT TODAY THAT CONTAINS A BRIEF REFERENCE TO VISITATION FOR 
THE NATURAL FATHER- THE COURT FINDS THAT THIS IS TOO VAGUE FOR 
THE COURT TO ENFORCE. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS (RELATING TO ALL THREE CAUSES OF ACTION) IS 
GRANTED. THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IS DENIED. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND ORDER 
FROM TODAY'S HEARING AND DELIEVER A COPY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL FOR 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM, AND SUBMIT THEM TO THE COURT BY 5/23/97. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and 
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE, 
minor children. 
CERTIFIED CONSENT OF FATHER 
GIVING UP RIGHTS TO 
CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN 
WITHIN MARRIAGE AND WAIVER 
OF NOTICE 
Probate No. 952900102AD 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. D7 YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 
WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING 
THIS DOCUMENT. BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS 
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR CHILDREN'S 
ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
) 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gentry Gamble, being first duly sworn upon oath, or affirmation, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. He was born on September 19, 1957 at Bethesda, Maryland. 
ii 
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2. He is the biological father of the minor children sought to be adopted, to wit: 
Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble, who was born on the February 10, 1987, Baron G. Wheeler 
Gamble, who was born on July 24, 1985. 
3. He understands that a verified petition for adoption of the minor children has been 
filed and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7 (1990, as amended). He must respond 
to the petition within thirty (30) days of service if he intends to contest the adoption, and hereby 
waives all notices pursuant to that section. 
4. He is not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, medication, or any impairment 
of ability to understand and appreciate the significance of giving his consent to adoption. 
5. He signs this consent freely and voluntarily and not under any duress, coercion, 
or force, 
6. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.3 (1990, as amended), 
his consent to adoption is effective when signed and may not be revoked. 
7. He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be released from all future parental 
duties toward and all future responsibilities for the adopted children, and have no further rights 
with regard to the children. 
8. He understands that from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the children will be adopted by the 
petitioner and the children shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the children of the 
petitioner and Catherine Wheeler. 
2 
9. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-10 (1990, as amended), 
from the time the final decree of adoption is entered, the petitioner and the children shall sustain 
the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties 
of that relationship. 
10. He has had the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice of an attorney 
of his choice. 
11. He understands that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.2 (1990, as amended), 
that he is entitled to a copy of this consent. 
12. He consents to the granting of a petition for adoption and consents to the adoption 
by petitioner of the children. 
13. He waives notice of pendency of these adoption proceedings pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7(4) (1990, as amended). 
14. He has read and understands the foregoing consent to adoption, and signs it freely 
and voluntarily. 
15. He states upon his oath or affirmation that all statements contained in this consent 
are true and correct to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned. 
DATED this fffl^ay of \] l ( t Y? h , 1995. 
Gentry G; 
$ U K 4 2 
whed\consent\mzn 
CERTIFICATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.2 (1990, as amended), I certify that on the 2^r 
day of 'qVA/iQk , 1995, personally appeared before me, Gentry Gamble, personally 
known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name 
is signed above, and I certify to the best of my information and belief that said person has read 
and understood the foregoing consent and has signed it freely and voluntarily. 
Where the above consent is signed by a birth mother, or the child sought to be adopted, 
or other person, I certify that I am a judge of a court that has jurisdiction over adoption 
proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that judge for the purpose of taking consents. 
DATED this 2 L 1 day of l V \ ^ l C ^ , 1995. 
JUDGE OR JUDICIALLY APPOINTED OFFICER 
In the case of persons signing the above consent other than a birth mother or an adoptee, 
I sign as a notary public as follows: 
NOTARY PUBLIC " 
Mindy Ml/denhall 
^ 525 East 100 South 
Salt laka City, Utah 84102 
My Commisajon Exptea 
<Hity22t 1989 
STATE O F UTAH 
NOTARTLPUBUC " ' ~ 
Residing at: ^[{ {lL\£ C'OUlHj i W l t u 
whed\consent\mm 
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ADDENDUM D 
EXHIBIT 
Kevin J. Fife (Bar No. 5962) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
-
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
APrt 2 7 1995 
Ltthe CUUVJTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE and 
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE, 
minor children. 
DECREE OF ADOPTION 
Probate No. 952900102AD 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on Thursday, the 27th day 
of April, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, for consideration of 
the petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble ("Trevor") and Baron G. 
Wheeler Gamble ("Baron"). Mr. Larsen was present in person and represented by counsel, 
Kevin J. Fife. Also present were Trevor and Baron and their natural mother, Catherine 
Wheeler. The court heard and considered the testimony of Petitioner, Trevor, Baron and 
Catherine Wheeler, considered the contents of the file and having heretofore made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to this action. 
2. Because Trevor and Baron were brought into Utah by Catherine Wheeler and 
Gentry Gamble, their natural parents, the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (1953, as amended), is not applicable to this adoption. 
3. Daniel R. Larsen is declared to have adopted Trevor and Baron and from this date 
forward shall owe to them all the rights and responsibilities of a natural father to natural children 
and Trevor and Baron shall owe to Daniel Larsen the responsibilities of a child to their natural 
father. 
4. All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to Trevor and Baron are 
hereby and forever terminated. 
5. Trevor and Baron shall continue to be known as Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and 
Baron G. Wheeler Gamble. 
6. The Clerk of this Court shall make four (4) certified copies of this Decree of 
Adoption which shall be delivered to Petitioner's counsel, and then shall seal this file and not 
permit examination of the file by any person or party without further order of the court. 
DATED this of April, 1995. 
COURT: 
I CERTIFY THATTH© tS A T O * COW OJW 
ORIGINAL D O ^ E ^ W Rl£INT>«TWRO 
DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STAlfc 
whed\petition\mm 2 ft r A t * c 
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